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thoughtful monist position of Nancey Murphy (Whatever Happened to the Soul, 
1998). Whereas Murphy considers her nonreductive physicalism as part of a 
scientific research program, the authors object that "this approach to the 
mind-body problem seems to be an expression of the low epistemic value 
usually attributed to theology by advocates of the complementarity 
approach" (168). For them, the weight of evidence clearly rests on theology 
and philosophy, and not science; "science provides little evidence at all for 
settling the issue" (170). Furthermore, where science is introduced in the 
book, it is basic and at times inaccurate. For example, biologists deservedly 
would be perplexed when informed that reproduction and growth "cannot 
be acc01mted for solely by the laws of chemistry and physics" (80). Or con-
sider the authors' contention "that DNA needs a driver." Quoting a noted 
French geneticist Francois Jacob that "'able to function only within the cell, 
the genetic message can do nothing by itself,'" they conclude that "he is 
describing something like a substance in which the DNA is an important part 
that needs instructions from some other part of the organism," which "leaves 
the door open for consideration of ... the soul" (296-7). Not only does this 
discussion of a driver for DNA mistake cause for context, but it confuses the 
very elements the authors have been at pains to distinguish elsewhere, i.e., 
the scientific and the metaphysical, for here they posit a metaphysical entity 
to perform biological tasks such as gene expression and determining how 
"'the cell senses danger and instigates responses to it'" (quoting geneticist 
Barbara McClintock). As my geneticist colleague commented, McClintock 
would rise out of her grave on hearing such an interpretation of her con-
tention that DNA needs a context in which to function. The welcome attempt 
to avoid genetic reductionism leads to serious misrepresentation of genetics 
and a type of philosophical soul-of-the-gaps. As a philosopher, I would be 
the last (well, almost) to denigrate the value of philosophy. But at the same 
time, philosophy must take account of the empirical. Science has greatly 
advanced our understanding not only of the human body with its brain, but 
of the human person expressed in its many features. We fail to integrate sci-
ence with our theology and philosophy at significant peril. 
Persons & Causes, by Timothy O'Connor. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000. Pp. xv, 125 plus References and Index. $35.00 (hardcover) 
STEWART GOETZ, Ursinus College 
Timothy O'Connor is one of the leading contemporary advocates of a lib-
ertarian view of freedom (free will or agency theory) that incorporates the 
concept of agent causation, and Persons & Causes is a first-rate presentation 
of this kind of libertarianism. It contains a defense of a version of a modal 
argument for incompatibilism (Chapter 1) and an examination of the agent 
causationist views of Thomas Reid, Richard Taylor, and Roderick Chisholm 
(Chapter 3). The principal aim of Persons ['1' Causes, however, is to explain 
why an adequate libertarianism must include agent causation. The main 
opponents of O'Connor are either (1) libertarians who affirm that agent cau-
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sation is necessary for a viable libertarianism but who disagree with 
O'Connor's view that reasons are not causes (deterministic or indeterminis-
tic) of choices (decisions); (2) libertarians who deny agent causation and 
who believe that reasons are indeterministic causes of choices; or (3) liber-
tarians who agree with O'Connor that reasons are not causes of choices but 
who believe that agent causation is superfluous for an adequate account of 
libertarian freedom. Because this reviewer is a proponent of the third kind 
of view (call it "noncausal libertarianism") and a target of some of 
O'Connor's comments in Persons & Causes, the substance of this review will 
be concerned with whether O'Connor has succeeded in showing that agent 
causation is necessary for an adequate libertarian account of freedom. 
According to O'Connor (Chapter 6), the central concept in agency theo-
ry is a macro-level agent-causal active power (active power, for short) that 
arises out of (emerges from) and is causally sustained by microphysical 
properties of a human being that is itself a natural object. When an agent 
exercises his active power (when he is an agent cause), he causally pro-
duces effects in the physical world (top-down causation). When and how 
an agent exercises his active power is freely determined by him (xiv). An 
exercise of active power immediately produces an-action-triggering-inten-
tion-to-so-act-here-and-now-to-satisfy-a-desire, where the coming-to-be of 
an action-triggering intention to act is itself an internal, causally structure-
less (simple) mental event. The mental act of choosing (making a decision) 
is a complex state of affairs that consists of the agent causation (exercise of 
active power) of the coming-to-be of an action-triggering intention (72, f.n. 
11). Elsewhere,' O'Com10r makes clear that in a causal relationship con-
sisting of an agent's causing of the coming-to-be on an intention, "there is 
no causally simple component event forming its [the causal relationship's] 
initial segment.N2 With agent causation, "there is no event at its [the causal 
relationship's] front end, ... but only an enduring agent."3 
O'Connor believes that there are two reasons why agent causation is 
required for an adequate account of libertarian freedom. First, an agent 
must determine or control his free action, and in order to do this he must 
control the coming-to-be of the action-triggering intention (it is the initial 
event-part of a free action). The agent controls the coming-to-be of the 
action-triggering intention by causally producing it through an exercise of 
active power, where the exercise of active power (agent causation) is itself 
essentially uncaused (81, f.n. 25). In contrast to O'COlmor's view, a non-
causal libertarianism of the type that this reviewer defends maintains that 
an agent has the ontologically basic power to choose. An exercising of the 
power to choose-a choice-is an internally causally structureless event 
that is essentially uncaused. When an agent makes a choice, he has intrin-
sic (nonrelational and, thus, noncausal) control of it. O'Connor believes 
that his view provides a more satisfactory account of control. 
TI1e second reason for thinking that agent causation is required for an 
adequate account of libertarian freedom arises from Donald Davidson's 
challenge to anyone who claims that reasons are not causes of actions. 
Davidson notes that it is possible for an agent to have a reason to act and 
perform that act, and yet that reason not be the reason that explains his 
action because he performed that action for a different reason that he also 
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had for performing it. In a situation where an agent has two reasons to 
perform the same action, it is possible to account for the distinction 
beh'Veen the reason that explains that action and the reason that does not 
but accompanies its performance, only if the reason that explains it causes 
it. O'Connor believes that an adequate libertarian response to Davidson 
requires the inclusion of agent causation. While reasons are not causes of 
free actions, exercisings of active agent-causal power are. (O'Connor main-
tains that reasons are structuring causes of action in the sense that they are 
tendency-conferring states that provide alternative paths for an agent to 
pursue, but they do not cause free actions in the sense of generating, pro-
ducing, or triggering the coming-to-be of intentions to act (95-101 )). An 
agent's exercise of active causal power "provides a necessary link between 
reason and behavior, without which the reason could not in any significant 
way explain the behavior." (88) Equipped with the notion of the exercise 
of active power, the agent causationist can say that the reason explaining 
an agent's free action is the one referred to in the intention that is caused by 
the agent's exercise of active power. Because the coming-to-be of an inten-
tion is the coming-to-be of an intention to act to satisfy or fulfill a particular 
desire (reason), the link between the free action and the reason that 
explains it is forged by the agent's exercise of active power that produces 
an intention that refers to that reason (85-91). "[R]easons and agent-causal 
initiation are each necessary to the agency theorist's explanatory scheme." 
(88) Thus, while neither O'Connor nor the noncausal libertarian claims 
that reasons are causes of free actions, O'Connor maintains that an ade-
quate answer to Davidson's challenge requires an appeal to causation that 
an agent causationist is equipped to give, but a noncausallibertarian is not. 
Is agent causation required for an adequate libertarianism, or is a non-
causal libertarianism sufficient? There are good reasons to think that agent 
causation is thoroughly superfluous. Consider O'Conner's first reason for 
believing otherwise. According to the noncausallibertarian, a choice is an 
internally causally structureless simple event that is an essentially 
uncaused exercising by an agent of his power to choose over which he has 
intrinsic control. What is O'Connor's alternative? A choice is a complex 
state of affairs that consists of an exercising of active power that causes the 
coming-to-be of an intention, where it is impossible for an exercising of 
power itself to be caused (it is essentially uncaused). Moreover, "exerting 
active power is intrinsically a direct exercise of control" such that an 
'I agency theory needn/t tell a further story that explains how the agent con-
trols this event [the complex event of the agent's exercising his causal 
power that produces the coming-to-be of an intention] itselC' (61) As 
O'Connor is well aware, a tu quoque response to the agent causationist is 
obvious: If the noncausallibertarian's appeal to the notion of an agent's 
intrinsic control of his exercising of his power to choose is inadequate, then 
the agent causationist's appeal to the concept of an agent's intrinsic control 
of his exertion of active power is too (59). O'Connor's response is to say 
that the notion of a choice that is the essentially uncaused exercising of the 
mental power to choose is clearly inappropriate for an internal, causally 
structureless occurrence that an agent intrinsically controls (59, f.n. 36). But 
why is this notion so clearly inappropriate? O'Connor doesn't say and, 
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therefore, one suspects that his retort is more bluff than stuff. Unless he 
can say something informative, he has given no reason "to complicate our 
picture of agency with the notion of agent causation" (59). 
What about O'Connor's second reason for including agent causation in 
agency theory?' He claims that without agent causation it is impossible for 
those libertarians who believe that reasons are not causes of free action to 
answer Davidson's challenge. An exercise of active power that causes the 
coming-to-be of an intention provides the necessary link between a free 
action of which the coming-to-be of the intention is the initial event-part 
and the reason that explains that action. There is no agent-causal link 
between that same action and the other reason the agent had for perform-
ing it, and this explains why the one reason explains its performance and 
the other does not. At this point, however, Davidson will merely retrench 
and argue as follows: Given that the exercise of active power causally 
explains the coming-to-be of an intention to act, in a situation where an 
agent has more than one reason for performing an action, what explains his 
exercise of active power? Presumably, the agent causationist will answer 
that what explains the exercise of active power is the reason for which the 
agent acts. But now it seems that the agent causationist has merely relocat-
ed the alleged problem. Davidson will argue that the agent has two rea-
sons for exercising his active power. What accounts for the fact that one of 
those reasons explains the agent's exercise of his active power while the 
other does not but merely accompanies it? O'Connor can't respond that 
the reason that explains the exercise of active power does so iI, virtue of an 
additional exercise of active power that causally links that reason with the 
exercise of active power that produces the coming-to-be of the intention to 
act. He can't claim this because he claims that the exercising of active 
power that causes the coming-to-be of the intention to act is essentially 
uncaused. Moreover, it is doubtful that O'Connor would want to claim 
this because it has all the makings of a vicious infinite regress. What, then, 
can he say in response to Davidson? It seems that he must say that an 
agent exercises his active power for the one reason and not the other, and 
the reason that explains this exercise of active power is not a cause of its 
exercise. But this is precisely the answer that the noncausal libertarian 
gives to Davidson: in a situation where an agent has more than one reason 
for making the same choice to act, he makes the choice for one reason and 
not the other, and the reason which explains that choice does not cause it.S 
In short, another tu quoque response to O'Connor is appropriate: If the non-
causal libertarian's answer to Davidson is inadequate, so is his. 
What any libertarian must do to answer Davidson adequately is pro-
vide an account of reasons explanation that is not causal in nature. I have 
argued elsewhere that the libertarian can provide such an account in terms 
of teleology." Reasons are purposes for which agents choose. They are not 
causes of choices. Given a teleological explanation of an essentially 
uncaused exercising of the power to choose, there is "no reason to compli-
cate our picture of agency with the notion of agent causation." (59) 
Contrary to what O'Connor argues in his excellent book Persons & Causes, 
agent causation is thoroughly superfluous to agency theory? 
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NOTES 
1. Timothy O'Connor, "Agent Causation," in Agents, Causes E-f Events, ed. 
by Timothy O'Connor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 186. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. What follows in this paragraph is a shortened version of a critique of 
O'Connor's view that I presented in "Failed Solutions to a Standard Libertarian 
Problem," Philosophical Studies 90 (1998): 237-244. 
5. See my "A Noncausal Theory of Agency," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 49 (1988): 303-316; and "Libertarian Choice," Faith 
and Philosophy 14 (1997): 195-211. 
6. See the papers referred to in endnote 5. 
7. I want to thank Andrei Buckareff and William Hasker for reading this 
review and making helpful comments. 
Augustine's Invention of the inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist. By 
Phillip Cary. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xviii + 214. $45 
(cloth). 
PAUL J. GRIFFITHS, University of Illinois at Chicago 
This book is an essay in intellectual history, an enterprise that its author 
understands, largely following Alasdair MacIntyre, as an attempt to trace 
the trajectory of a tradition through time. Such trajectories, Cary thinks, are 
produced by the handing on of intellectual materials (texts, concepts, 
modes of argument, epistemological and ontological commitments) from 
one generation to the next, and by the attempt of those whose thought 
moves within the bounds of some tradition or other to deal with the prob-
lems raised by that tradition for itself, and those produced for it by its 
interaction with what is alien to it. 
Cary deals in this book with a particular episode in the history of the 
tradition of Christian thought, so understood. It is, as he presents it, a dra-
matic episode, one in which the inner self is for the first time explicitly pre-
sented as a space in which explorations can be undertaken and discoveries 
made, a space the exploration of which is essential for the closer and fuller 
understanding of God. This is what Cary calls the "invention" of the inner 
self. In so calling it he plays upon the range of meanings to be found in the 
Latin invenire: finding, discovery, creation, construction. The poet 'invents' 
his tropes and images; the rhetor preparing a speech 'invents' his periods 
and 'discovers' his authorities; and the philosopher faced with a difficulty 
'finds' his concepts and 'constructs' his arguments-all this is suggested by 
inverT ire, and by using the term Cary does not mean to suggest that the 
'invention' of the idea that the self is timer space should be understood in 
such a way as to deny that the self's inner space was also discovered 
(found) by Augustine. Cary does in fact thti1k that Augustine's invention 
was an unfortunate one from a Christian point of view; but his goal in the 
book is neither to defend nor to explain any such view, but rather to show 
